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Why is it that we, as farmers, think that other farmers will be willing to do things that we won’t do? In developing 
agricultural policy we often base our decisions 
on the premise that we can force farmers some-
where else in the world to make decisions that we 
would not be willing to make.
This fact struck me at a personal level the other 
day when a student from Argentina was vigorous-
ly complaining about the level of U.S. subsidies. 
He said that prices would not get better until 
something was done about U.S. subsidies.
I asked him what he would do if prices dropped 
by X percent. How would he change his behav-
ior? He said he would still put a crop in. I then 
asked what he would do if he could not afford 
to put the crop in. He said he would lease the 
land to another farmer who would produce on it. 
Suddenly the light went on. Farmers in the U.S. 
are no more willing to change their behavior in 
response to low prices or reduced subsidies than 
farmers anywhere else in the world. But then 
again, we are still learning this lesson.
In the 1985 Farm Bill, Congress deliberately 
reduced the loan rate under the assumption that 
higher rates supported world price levels and en-
couraged wheat production in the E.U. The rea-
soning was that if the loan rate were reduced the 
European CAP export subsidies would become 
so expensive that they would have to be reduced. 
This, in turn, would force European farmers to 
reduce their wheat production, leaving more of 
the world export market available to American 
farmers. 
Guess what? European politicians may be even 
less willing than their U.S. counterparts to reduce 
farm support because they remember what it is 
like to be hungry (remember WWI and WWII). 
Even after the policy depressed prices of the 1985 
and 1990 Farm Bills and payments of billions of 
dollars, we are now told that the E.U. will soon 
be able to export wheat without export subsidies. 
So essentially the reduced prices and billions of 
dollars in deficiency payments bought us nothing 
for crop farmers.
Again with the 1996 and 2002 Farm Bills we have 
eliminated any mechanism that would put a floor 
under crop prices while supporting U.S. farm in-
come with Loan Deficiency payments (LDPs) and 
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) and a healthy 
dose of  fixed decoupled payments. The hope is 
that farmers in nations that compete with us for 
exports will reduce their production or at least 
slow down the rate of growth in their production.
The results of this pressure tactic have been 
spectacularly unsuccessful. It is hard to find any 
evidence that would suggest that our competi-
tors have reduced their production in response 
to lower prices. One thing it has done is further 
impoverish farmers in less developed countries as 
well as farmers in general.
The drumbeat is becoming ever louder since the 
major problem in world markets is the level of 
U.S. subsidies. The reasoning goes like this: If 
U.S. farmers are deprived of their subsidies they 
will reduce production. In turn producers in other 
parts of the world, especially small farmers in less 
developed countries, will receive higher prices and 
be able to afford to expand their production.
But U.S. farmers think the same way that farmers 
all over the world think. Few U.S. farmers are will-
ing to give up farming unless the banker makes 
it impossible. And, even then, the land is simply 
turned over to another and remains in production.
When policies are based on the premise that 
“farmers somewhere else are willing to make deci-
sions that we are unwilling to make,” we will get 
nowhere and farmers everywhere, in the absence 
of a weather event somewhere, will be plagued 
with low prices.
